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“Universities are generally not inclined to litigate. . . . A lot of 
private sector companies, the big ones, look at universities as toothless 
tigers, because they are not going to assert their patent rights.” –Howard 
Bremer1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pursuit of patents is a key avenue of economic development 
and revenue generation for American research universities, and one with 
significant policy implications for higher education.2  In a time of 
shifting funding models for higher education,3 the $1.8 billion dollars 
American universities generated in revenues in 2011 from licensing their 
patents4 makes patenting an attractive candidate for further university 
attention and resource investment.  Spurred in part by the Bayh-Dole Act 
of 1980,5 research universities across the country have created vast 
institutional apparatuses—typically centered in technology transfer 
offices (“TTOs”)—to help move ideas invented in the laboratory and 
 
 1. Transcribed Interview with Howard Bremer, Emeritus Patent Counsel, Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 1, 2011) (on file with author).  An architect of the 
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Howard Bremer served for over forty years as patent counsel to the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (the patent and licensing organization affiliated with the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, known within the industry as WARF). 
 2.  See CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001); ROGER L. GEIGER, KNOWLEDGE AND MONEY: RESEARCH 
UNIVERSITIES AND THE PARADOX OF THE MARKETPLACE (2004). 
 3.  See, e.g., E. Gordon Gee, Colleges Must Find Innovative Ways to Finance Their 
Missions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 30, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Must-Find-
Innovative/129568/ (noting that state support of higher education as a percentage of total operating 
budgets will never return to pre-2000 levels); William R. Doyle & Jennifer A. Delaney, Higher 
Education Funding: The New Normal, 41 CHANGE: THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING 60-62 (2009) 
(same). 
 4.  See Goldie Blumenstyk, Universities Report $1.8-Billion in Earnings on Inventions in 
2011, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 28, 2012), http://chronicle.com/article/University-Inventions-
Earned/133972/ (reporting that 157 research universities received approximately $1.8 billion in 
licensing revenues in fiscal year 2011). 
 5.  Signed into law by President Carter on December 12, 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act added a 
chapter to the nation’s patent laws that allows universities to retain ownership of faculty inventions 
that are discovered in the course of federally funded research.  Originally introduced as the 
University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, the Bayh-Dole Act was named in honor of its 
bi-partisan sponsors, former Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN) and former Senator Bob Dole (R-KS).  For 
more information on this “remarkably important piece of science policy legislation,” JONATHAN R. 
COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO PREEMINENCE, ITS INDISPENSABLE 
NATIONAL ROLE, WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED 163 (2009), see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public 
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996); Sean M. O’Connor, Mistaken Assumptions: The Roots of 
Stanford v. Roche in Post-War Government Patent Policy (Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished Univ. of 
Wash. Sch. of Law Research. Paper No. 2012-05), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024631. 
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classroom into commercial application.6 
A patent is a government-granted right that gives its holder the 
ability to exclude others from manufacturing, using, selling, offering for 
sale, or importing any product or process claimed by the patent for 
twenty years from the date of application.7  Patents are notoriously 
expensive to obtain and even more expensive to enforce.8  Because 
patents are not self-enforcing, owners of them face pressure to pursue 
infringers if they wish to maintain the market exclusivity provided by 
their patent.9  An infringed patent quickly loses value if the owner does 
not seek to end the infringement by suing the infringer in the hope of 
obtaining a court order enjoining the infringement and awarding 
lucrative damages to the patent owner.  In this way, to some extent every 
patent’s value flows from the threat of litigation.10 
Yet despite the increasing importance of patents in generating 
revenue for research universities,11 to date little scholarly attention has 
been given to the considerations that influence universities to enforce 
their patents through pursuing infringement litigation.12  This article 
describes one of the first focused studies of university behavior in this 
 
 6.  See generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: 
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2004) (providing a detailed history of the Bayh-Dole Act, TTOs, and patenting by 
universities in the United States). 
 7.  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).  The right to exclude is central to the concept of a patent.  
Professor Owen-Smith analogizes patents to “fences in the sense that they offer limited monopoly 
rights to the ‘plot’ of knowledge their claims demarcate.”  Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and 
Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 HIGHER EDUC. 91, 
94 (2005). 
 8.  C.f. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A 
Window on Competition, 31 RAND J. ECON. 129, 129 (2001). 
 9.  See, e.g., Owen-Smith, supra note 7, at 94 (noting that “the efficacy of a patent depends 
on its owners’ ability to police their property”); Alexander Poltorak, Thar’s Gold in Them Thar 
Patents: Why It Pays to Protect Patent Portfolios, 12 UNIV. BUS. 18, 23 (2009) (noting that 
“[a]lthough a patent is a right to exclude others, it doesn’t come with its own police.”). 
 10.  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research 
on Patent Litigation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND 
PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 199-226, 205 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (“the patent premium flows 
from patent litigation or, more typically, the threat of litigation”). 
 11.  See generally DEREK C. BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 57-78 (2003); BURTON ALLEN WEISBROD, JEFFREY 
P. BALLOU & EVELYN DIANE ASCH, MISSION AND MONEY: UNDERSTANDING THE UNIVERSITY 
149-161 (2008); GEIGER, supra note 2, at 180-231. 
 12.  But see Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents 
in Their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 218-19 (2006) (in addition to “the growth in patent-
related litigation involving universities,” identifying “the stifling of discourse and the erosion in the 
norms of sharing and colloquy historically associated with the scholarly enterprise” as costs related 
to the gains to universities from engaging in technology transfer). 
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realm, taking a qualitative approach toward building understanding of 
assertive university patent enforcement from the perspective of a small 
but important sample of decision-makers at universities that recently 
asserted their patents.  Findings provide unique insights into the complex 
relationship between universities and their licensees, difficulties inherent 
in university commercialization efforts, and how universities view their 
simultaneous pursuits of mission and money through patents.  Specific 
revelations and suggestions flowing from the study include the 
following: 
 
• Litigation As Mission-Enhancing: Some universities view participation 
as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as condoned or even 
mandated by their research and commercialization missions, despite 
what some critics view as the activity’s incompatibility with the notion 
of a university’s public-serving mission. 
• Money As Motivator: Revenue generation is often a principal 
motivator for universities that choose to enforce their patents through 
infringement litigation, even though industry literature only indirectly 
touts litigation’s revenue-generating potential. 
• Structural Deterrents: The high cost of legal fees, concern for being 
viewed as overly litigious, and reputational risks related to contingency 
fee arrangements with outside law firms provide disincentives for 
some universities contemplating pursuit of patent infringers. 
• Fear of Retribution: The identity of would-be defendants may cause 
some institutions to abandon pursuit of their infringement claims out of 
concern for retribution to the university, particularly with respect to 
sponsored research funding. 
• Litigation Realities Driving Licensing Decisions: Concern for the 
responsibility and costs involved in litigating non-exclusively licensed 
patents may lead some institutions to favor an exclusive licensing 
strategy for their patents, on the belief that doing so will save them 
money and may even spare their involvement as a plaintiff in any 
infringement action. 
• Litigating Unlicensed Patents: Although many universities may be 
hesitant to litigate unlicensed patents, shrewd companies have devised 
a way for them to turn unlicensed patents into putatively licensed ones, 
thereby contravening the Bayh-Dole Act’s purposes and masking the 
character of what some may view as speculative enforcement activity. 
 
In view of its content, this article should be of interest to a variety 
of audiences, including but not limited to the following: 
 
• University Technology Transfer Professionals: TTO professionals 
represent the primary university doors through which industry contact 
4
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and commercialization occur.13  As such, controversies or discussions 
that may give rise to patent infringement litigation are more likely to 
involve or emanate from these offices than they are other sectors of the 
university.  This article provides salient description of how five 
prominent TTOs frame and approach such conflicts.  The policy 
concerns and considerations highlighted here provide fodder for 
further discussion and reflection on the activity and the possible 
development of industry best practices concerning patent enforcement. 
• Scholars: While the costs and consequences of university involvement 
in technology transfer garner perennial scholarly attention, such 
treatment typically focuses on patent licenses, patent applications, and 
royalty streams.14  With the current influence of entrepreneurialism on 
higher education, more attention is being given to university start-ups, 
spin-offs, and the efficacy of the Bayh-Dole system in creating jobs 
and spurring regional economies.15  This article breaks new ground by 
providing much needed investigation into an overlooked arena of the 
university commercialization enterprise.  Scholars interested in 
empirical studies of patent litigation, complex institutional behavior, 
and technology transfer and commercialization will find this article’s 
approach and findings useful for guiding further inquiry and analysis. 
• Policy Makers: America’s patent system has received no shortage of 
attention lately from lawmakers and educational policy leaders alike.  
Indeed, many universities and higher education industry groups 
 
 13.  See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY: MARKETS, STATE, AND HIGHER EDUCATION 23 (2004) (identifying TTOs as “interstitial 
organizations” that connect markets with higher education). 
 14.  See, e.g., Joshua B. Powers, Commercializing Academic Research: Resource Effects on 
Performance of University Technology Transfer, 74 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 26 (2003); Joshua B. 
Powers & Eric G. Campbell, University Technology Transfer: In Tough Economic Times, CHANGE: 
THE MAG. OF HIGHER LEARNING, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 43-47; Jerry G. Thursby, Richard Jensen, & 
Marie C. Thursby, Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University Licensing: A Survey of 
Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59 (2001); and Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. 
Thursby, Who Is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 MGMT. 
SCI. 90 (2002). 
 15.  See generally Donald S. Siegel & Phillip H. Phan, Analyzing the Effectiveness of 
University Technology Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education, in 16 ADVANCES IN 
THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, & ECON. GROWTH (Gary Libecap ed., 2005); 
ROBERT E. LITAN & ROBERT M. COOK-DEEGAN, RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION 
AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM (2011); Letter from Mary Sue Coleman, Co-Chair, Nat’l 
Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship, to Gary Locke, U.S. Secretary of Commerce 
on University Commercialization (Apr. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12084; Michael N. Bastedo & Nathan F. 
Harris, The State Role in Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: Governance, Oversight, 
and Public University Start-Up Innovation, in 19 ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 
INNOVATION, & ECONOMIC GROWTH (2009); Michael M. Crow, The Research University As 
Comprehensive Knowledge Enterprise: A Prototype for a New American University, in UNIVERSITY 
RESEARCH FOR INNOVATION (Luc E. Weber & James J. Duderstadt eds., 2010). 
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lobbied in favor of the sweeping reform to the nation’s patent laws that 
Congress enacted in the fall of 2011.16  With the potential—and 
reality—of billion-dollar patent infringement verdicts,17 massive 
defensive accumulation and licensing of patents,18 and increased 
attention by the Supreme Court on fundamental questions of patent 
law,19 public dialogue continues to intensify concerning the 
appropriate contours of how patents are acquired and used.20  As 
drivers of innovation and holders of many patents, universities have an 
important role to play in these debates.  By examining the legal and 
policy questions inherent in how some universities choose to use their 
patents, this article offers fresh, colorful, and relevant perspectives that 
bear further reflection by policy makers interested in aligning patent 
laws and policies with the public interest. 
• Lawyers for Universities: In-house counsel at universities without a 
history of involvement in patent litigation may be uncertain as to 
 
 16.  See Goldie Blumenstyk, U.S. Senate Passes Sweeping Overhaul of Patent System, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 8, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/US-Senate-Passes-
Sweeping/126649/ (noting support for patent reform by the Association of American Universities); 
see also Letter from Hunter R. Rawlings III et al, President, Ass’n. of Am. Univs., to the Honorable 
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, and the Honorable Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member, U.S. Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary (June 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=6117 (indicating support of the Association of American Universities, the American 
Council on Education, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association of Public and 
Land-grant Universities, the Association of University Technology Managers, and the Council on 
Governmental Relations).  Admittedly, others within the higher education community opposed 
patent reform.  See Goldie Blumenstyk, Several Universities Oppose Pending ‘Patent Reform’ 
Legislation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 21, 2011), http://chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/several-
universities-oppose-pending-patent-reform-legislation/34091 (noting the opposition of WARF and 
others).  For more on the new law, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-029, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011). 
 17.  See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Apple Wins $1.05 Billion Verdict, PATENTLY-O BLOG (Aug. 
24, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/08/apple-wins-105-billion-verdict.html (reporting 
that jury awarded $1.05 billion to Apple in damages for competitor Samsung’s infringement of 
Apple’s utility and design patents claiming various features of handheld devices). 
 18.  See Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 
(2012) (describing advent of mass patent aggregators and their business model). 
 19.  See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) 
(invalidating as encompassing laws of nature patents claiming methods for calibrating proper 
dosage of thiopurine drugs to treat autoimmune diseases); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012), cert granted, 132 S.Ct. 1794 (2012) (certiorari granted to 
determine whether human genes are patentable). 
 20.  See, e.g., LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP (2010) 
(questioning the private rights theory of IP ownership); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public 
Law, 20 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 41 (advocating for the treatment of patent validity challenges as 
public law litigation); Robin Cooper Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs (Aug. 10, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2127558 (arguing that “IP rights 
[have] become the vehicles for IP wrongs” and suggesting creation of a doctrine of inappropriate 
use of intellectual property). 
6
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where to turn for insights into the challenges and opportunities posed 
by patent enforcement.  By relying on the informed opinions of TTO 
professionals at universities with vast experience litigating patents, this 
article serves as a handy primer for in-house counsel first approaching 
the subject area.  Outside counsel to universities also may find this 
article helpful in understanding common university concerns and 
orientations toward patent enforcement and in educating new 
university clients on the topic, as appropriate. 
 
Now for a few words on what follows.  Part I provides a brief 
background on patent infringement litigation involving university 
plaintiffs, including information on the activity’s costs, historical 
incidence, and how leading voices within the technology transfer 
community view the activity.  Part II details the methodology used in the 
study conducted for this article.  It describes the research questions that 
guided the study, its theoretical framework, information on participants 
and how they were selected for inclusion, and other information 
concerning data collection.  Finally, Part III presents and discusses the 
study’s findings, which are arrayed thematically. 
II. BACKGROUND ON UNIVERSITY PATENT ENFORCEMENT 
A. Definitional and Procedural Issues 
Universities can become involved in various forms of litigation 
involving patents, including litigation related to the prosecution of 
patents, disputes concerning inventorship, defense of patent 
infringement allegations, and common law disputes over contractual 
issues that concern patents.21  While all of the aforementioned activities 
loosely may be labeled “patent litigation,” this article takes a narrow 
focus on one form of patent litigation: lawsuits in which a university, by 
itself or with another party, alleges infringement of one or more claims 
of a university-owned patent.22 
Universities that own patents are not treated differently from other 
patent owners under prevailing interpretation of patent law by the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”).  Thus, any lawsuit in 
 
 21.  Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 639-644 (2011) (discussing the variety of university 
involvement in disputes concerning patents). 
 22.  I use university to mean any non-profit, public or private, undergraduate- and graduate-
degree granting institution located in the United States that engages in patenting and technology 
transfer, including any university-controlled, or closely-affiliated, patent or research entities that 
may be separately incorporated from the university. 
7
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which infringement of a university-owned patent is alleged must, as a 
matter of patent law, include the university patent owner as a named 
plaintiff.23  As a practical matter, this legal constraint leads to an obvious 
result in situations where a university owns an unlicensed patent over 
which it wishes to sue.  The university simply will sue the alleged 
infringer on its own.  However, in situations where a university owns a 
patent and subsequently licenses it to a company, the university 
ultimately cannot escape involvement as a named plaintiff in an 
infringement action involving the patent, so long as less than “all 
substantial rights” to the patent have been transferred to the licensee.24 
B. Costs 
Patent infringement litigation has been called the “sport of kings” 
because it is costly, complex, and uncertain.25  Survey data collected in 
2010 from law firms specializing in intellectual property (“IP”)26 law 
revealed that for patent infringement lawsuits with $1 million to $25 
million at risk, the mean cost for one party to take a case through trial 
and any appeal was $2,769,000.27  For lawsuits with over $25 million at 
risk, the mean cost was $6,018,000.28 
In addition to the high costs typically involved in pursuing patent 
 
 23.  See, e.g., AsymmetRx, Inc. v. Biocare Med., LLC, 582 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(vacating and remanding patent infringement case for failure to join university patent owner as 
plaintiff).  Universities can avoid participating as named plaintiffs in such lawsuits by incorporating 
a separate legal entity to own and license patents for the benefit of the university.  For a discussion 
of the various ways in which universities structure their technology transfer operations, including 
structures that avoid university involvement as named plaintiffs in infringement litigation, see Jacob 
H. Rooksby, University Involvement in Patent Infringement Litigation, 47 LES NOUVELLES,8-18 
(2012). 
 24.  The CAFC has interpreted “all substantial rights” to include many different rights, but the 
right to sue for infringement is “particularly dispositive.”  Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. 
Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Alfred E. Mann Found. 
for Sci. Research. v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that “the nature 
and scope of the licensor’s retained right to sue accused infringers is the most important factor in 
determining whether an exclusive license transfers sufficient rights to render the licensee the owner 
of the patent”); Jeffrey L. Newton, Assuring All Substantial Rights in Exclusive Patent Licenses, 44 
LES NOUVELLES 235-254 (2009) (reviewing CAFC precedent with respect to “all substantial rights” 
in patent licensing); Timothy Denny Greene, “All Substantial Rights”: Toward Sensible Patent 
Licensee Standing, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 1 (2012) (same). 
 25.  Douglas J. Kline, Patent Litigation: The Sport of Kings, TECH. REV. (Apr. 28, 2004), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/business/13562/. 
 26.  This article uses the term IP exclusively in reference to patents. 
 27.  AIPLA, LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 
I-153, I-154 (2011). 
 28.  Id. 
8
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infringement litigation, some have lambasted university participation in 
the activity out of concern that it betrays the public’s trust.29  These 
critics argue that universities receive tax subsidies in order to pursue 
public goods such as teaching and conducting research, not for 
participating in litigation aimed at protecting the market exclusivity of 
the university’s patent licensees.  Given that taxpayers fund sixty percent 
of all universities’ research activities through the award of federal 
research grants,30 university participation in patent infringement 
litigation strikes some as all the more inappropriate. 
In addition to these reputational concerns, participation in patent 
infringement litigation can lead to other indirect costs as well, such as 
the opportunity cost of having key personnel consult with attorneys 
about litigation strategy, review and produce documents during 
discovery, and testify in depositions and/or at trial.  With respect to 
university participants, patent enforcement activity also may lead to a 
decrease in TTO productivity.31 
Out of presumed concern for the above costs, some universities 
may seek to avoid enforcing their patents through infringement 
litigation.  This inclination, however, can lead to a different price: being 
seen as a weak defender of IP by coveted commercial partners, whether 
current or prospective.  As Howard Bremer, an architect of the Bayh-
Dole Act, told me, “a lot of private sector companies, the big ones, look 
at universities as toothless tigers, because they are not going to assert 
their patent rights.  One of the primary reasons, of course, is the cost 
involved.”32 
C. Frequency of Occurrence 
Comprehensive empirical research into lawsuit filings shows that in 
fact many universities engage in enforcing their patents through 
 
 29.  See, e.g., JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF 
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 161 (2005). 
 30.  MOWERY ET AL., supra note 6, at 24. 
 31.  See Scott Shane & Deepak Somaya, The Effects of Patent Litigation on University 
Licensing Efforts, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 739 (2007) (reporting that university involvement in 
patent litigation correlated negatively with the number of new patent licenses and new exclusive 
licenses filed by universities in subsequent years). 
 32.  Bremer, supra note 1.  See also Marie Powers, Patent Litigation: Sometimes It’s A Risk 
Worth Taking, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.technologytransfertactics.com/content/2011/03/30/patent-litigation-sometimes-
it%E2%80%99s-a-risk-worth-taking-2/ (“Universities are almost always inclined to try to settle a 
dispute before heading to court, but TTOs engaged in this process need to understand that 
companies often take advantage of this inclination.”). 
9
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infringement litigation, despite the direct and indirect costs noted 
above.33  Indeed, over sixty American universities (both public and 
private) participated as plaintiffs in over 245 patent infringement 
lawsuits filed between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 2010.34  Given 
the limitations inherent in data collection concerning historic litigation 
activity, the actual numbers of patent infringement lawsuits filed by 
universities and university plaintiffs participating in those actions 
undoubtedly are higher.35  Regardless, for those universities that have 
litigated their patents, some victories have been significant36—as have 
some defeats.37 
 
 33.  Jacob H. Rooksby, Universities That Litigate Patents (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author). 
 34.  Id.  For other quantitative reports of university involvement as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement lawsuits (covering smaller time periods), see Rooksby, supra note 21, at 660 
(reporting 57 patent infringement lawsuits filed by universities between Jan. 1, 2009 through Dec. 
31, 2010) and Christopher M. Holman, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo-Kansas City, Presentation at 
Santa Clara and School of Law Symposium: University Patent Litigation (Jan. 30, 2009), available 
at http://www.chtlj.org/sites/default/files/media/symposiums/v025/slides/holman.ppt (reporting 190 
patent infringement lawsuits filed by universities between Jan. 1, 2000 and Jan 24, 2009). 
 35.  Rooksby, supra note 33. 
 36.  See, e.g., Todd Bishop, Microsoft’s Eolas Settlement: UC Gets $30.4M, THE MICROSOFT 
BLOG (Oct. 10, 2007, 5:02 PM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2007/10/10/microsofts-eolas-
settlement-uc-gets-30-4m/ (reporting that University of California received $30.4 million in a 
settlement of a patent infringement lawsuit it brought with its licensee against Microsoft Corp.); 
Susan Kelley, Hewlett-Packard, Cornell Reach Settlement in Patent Case, CORNELL CHRON. 
ONLINE (June 9, 2010), http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/June10/HPCaseClosed.html (reporting 
that Cornell University settled on confidential terms a patent infringement lawsuit it brought against 
Hewlett-Packard after court reduced university’s damages award to $71.3 million); Katherine 
Lymn, U Heads for “Patent Cliff,” THE MINN. DAILY (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.mndaily.com/2011/10/06/u-heads-’patent-cliff’ (reporting that University of Minnesota 
received more than $350 million in running royalties from GlaxoSmithKline since 1999 as a result 
of settling a patent infringement lawsuit university brought in 1998); Tom Fontaine, Pitt Awarded 
$73.6 Million in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW (April 25, 2012, 2:14 PM), 
http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/1125208-74/patent-varian-pitt-million-universities-court-
university-percent-sales-award (reporting that judge ordered medical device company to pay 
University of Pittsburgh $73.6 million for infringing university’s patent, doubling the jury’s award 
after finding willful infringement); Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 27, 2012 12:26 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/carnegie-mellon-wins-117-billion-in-patent-case-
668013/ (reporting that jury found company knowingly infringed university-owned patents directed 
toward hard-disk drive circuit technology and awarded university over $1 billion in damages). 
 37.  See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(invalidating on appeal patents owned by the University of Rochester in patent infringement lawsuit 
against pharmaceutical companies); Goldie Blumenstyk, Taking on Goliath: U. of Rochester Risks 
Millions in Patent Fight with Pharmaceutical Giants, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20, 2002, at 
A27 (reporting that University of Rochester had established an eight-figure legal fund to pursue the 
aforementioned case); Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(invalidating on appeal patents co-owned by New York University and vacating and reversing 
10
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D. Technology Transfer Community Urges Caution 
While the participation of universities as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement litigation is not infrequent, virtually no research has been 
conducted on university decision-making about patent enforcement or 
the intra-institutional impact of university decisions to pursue such 
litigation.38  However, a few leading groups within the technology 
transfer community have issued cautions.39  For example, in a white 
paper released in 2007 by Stanford University and ten other prominent 
American research universities, the authors urged that “enforcement 
action should be carefully considered.”40  The authors stressed that 
universities should be mindful of their mission to use patents to promote 
technology development for society’s benefit.41  To that end, the 
universities argued that litigation is “seldom the preferred option for 
resolving disputes” and should be pursued only if there is a “mission-
oriented rationale for doing so” that can be clearly articulated to internal 
constituencies and to the public.42 
The Association of University Technology Managers (“AUTM”) 
—the leading industry group for university technology transfer 
professionals—subsequently endorsed the Stanford white paper, as did a 
National Academy of Sciences committee established to review 
university IP management.43  The National Academy of Sciences 
committee wrote in its report that “enforcement of IP rights against 
suspected infringers should be approached carefully to protect the 
institution’s resources and reputation.”44  In furtherance of this 
suggestion, the committee recommended that a university’s decision to 
litigate a patent should reflect its reasons for obtaining and licensing 
patents in the first instance.  Listed examples included: 
 
 
record-setting $1.67 billion jury award in patent infringement lawsuit brought by university and its 
exclusive licensee). 
 38.  For one notable exception, see Shane & Somaya, supra note 31. 
 39.  See generally Press Release, Leland Stanford Univ., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to 
Consider in Licensing University Technology (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www-
leland.stanford.edu/group/OTL/documents/whitepaper-10.pdf 
 40.  Id. at 6. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON MGMT. OF UNIV. INTELLECTUAL PROP.: LESSONS 
FROM A GENERATION OF EXPERIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DIALOGUE, MANAGING UNIVERSITY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 82 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza 
eds., 2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13001&page=1. 
 44.  Id. at 7. 
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• contractual or ethical obligations to protect the rights of 
existing licensees to enjoy the benefits conferred by the 
licensees; 
• disregard by an infringer of scientific or professional 
norms and standards, such as use of medical technologies 
outside standards of care or professional guidelines; 
• disregard by an infringer of the institution’s legitimate 
rights, for example, as evidenced by a refusal to negotiate 
a license on reasonable terms.45 
 
The committee concluded that while infringement litigation is rarely the 
preferred method for resolving patent disputes, “it is an option important 
for universities to retain.”46 
III. METHODOLOGY 
A. Questions for Research 
In an effort to build understanding of the considerations and 
pressures that influence university participation as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement litigation, I took a qualitative approach in the study 
described here to investigate a simple yet surprisingly unanswered 
couplet of questions concerning how university decision-makers regard 
university patent enforcement.  Namely, what factors or constraints do 
they report considering in determining whether to litigate their 
university’s patents?  And how do they weigh fundamental concerns for 
revenue generation and allegiance to university research missions in 
their decisions to enforce university patents through infringement 
litigation?47 
A qualitative interview approach was deployed in order to collect 
evocative data not available from other sources, such as university press 
releases, court filings, or judicial opinions.48  I anticipated that the 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Given the confidential and often sensitive nature of university activities in this realm, I 
did not solicit details concerning any specific cases involving participants’ universities (whether 
contemplated, ongoing, or completed).  While some participants referenced details of such cases 
during interviews, I tried to steer their comments toward the hypothetical, as the study’s purpose 
was not to document institutional histories of patent enforcement actions.  I wanted interviewees to 
draw on these experiences only insofar as they were helpful in explaining institutional practices, 
beliefs, and decision-making. 
 48.  For an excellent and recent example of qualitative methods used in IP legal scholarship, 
see David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. 
12
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study’s sample size would be small, given the sensitivity of the research 
topic and the difficulty of securing participation from qualified 
participants, of which there are not many.  Additionally, there are very 
few university leaders in a position to make decisions about patent 
litigation, and even fewer ones with fresh experience doing so.  In light 
of the potential value of many patents and the proprietary nature of 
patent rights, those with knowledge understandably are reluctant to 
divulge key elements of strategy and decision-making.  With these 
realities in mind, I determined that an exploratory study relying on a few 
key informants with deep knowledge of organizational history and the 
practice of patent enforcement within their universities (and more 
broadly) would be appropriate and add significantly to the knowledge 
base.49 
B. Theoretical Framework 
Academic capitalism theory and the “two-good” framework help 
situate this study.50  Academic capitalism theory suggests that university 
decision-makers—facing pressures to find new sources of revenue while 
steeped in an academic culture that views faculty output as potentially 
proprietary and lucrative—are predisposed to monetize intellectual 
property when possible.51  Patenting provides an attractive vehicle for 
doing this.  While licensing patents to industry is the traditional method 
for universities to generate revenues from research investments, it is not 
the only method.52  Alleged infringers may be sued for the purpose of 
obtaining lucrative damages awards or extracting favorable licensing 
arrangements through out-of-court settlements.  Many see such pursuit 
 
REV. 335 (2012) (collecting data through in-depth interviews and analysis of contingency fee 
agreements); see also Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 927-940 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer eds., 
2010) (describing the appropriateness of qualitative methods to examine under-explored legal issues 
or situations). 
 49.  For further justification for studying small samples to provide insight into rare but 
significant events, see James G. March, Lee S. Sproull & Michal Tamuz, Learning from Samples of 
One or Fewer, 2 ORG. SCI. 1 (1991). 
 50.  The canonical works on academic capitalism theory include SHEILA SLAUGHTER & 
LARRY L. LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL 
UNIVERSITY (1997) and SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 13.  See generally WEISBROD, ET AL., 
supra note 11, for an introduction to the two-good framework of higher education. 
 51.  See Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Expanded 
Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 345, 362-63 (2007) 
(noting the considerable financial pressures on universities to “compete in the research marketplace 
through protecting and profiting from their investments”). 
 52.  Poltorak, supra note 9. 
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as a “common rationale for patenting,”53 albeit one that may place 
universities in “awkward positions with regard to their treatment of . . . 
the public trust.”54 
The two-good framework articulated by Weisbrod, Ballou, and 
Asch recognizes that universities must balance “mission goods”—such 
as supporting faculty and student research through patenting and 
technology transfer efforts—with “revenue goods,” or activities 
primarily aimed at generating money to support further investment in 
mission goods.55  Thus, while maintaining the public’s trust in 
universities’ research missions is important, universities simultaneously 
engage in “crass money-making activities” to generate revenue that can 
be used to further their commendable social missions.56 
Mission activities and revenue activities are not always neatly 
separable.57  Some are best described as hybrid activities that further 
both mission and revenue goods.58  Whether mission or money 
predominates in any given university activity likely depends on the 
university and the particular values at stake.  Tensions can arise in that 
all universities, whether public or private, “can be expected to seize 
opportunities to enhance profits.”59  However, when doing so conflicts 
with an important mission good, the actual or contemplated revenue-
generating activity may yield.60 
University patent enforcement is in many ways a delicate hybrid 
activity shaped by these complex forces.61  A university’s strong patent 
 
 53.  Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 118 (2010); cf. Poltorak, supra note 9, at 18 
(questioning that “if not for the unspoken threat of litigation, who would ever license a patent, 
which, at the end of the day, is nothing more than a right to sue for infringement?”). 
 54.  SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 13, at 112. 
 55.  WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 11, at 58-76. 
 56.  Id. at 2; see also Bok, supra note 11. 
 57.  The myriad activities associated with collegiate athletics, specifically Division I football 
and basketball programs, help illustrate this point.  For example, lucrative endorsement deals with 
athletic companies that provide top-of-the-line equipment may help collegiate players enhance their 
skills as student-athletes (a mission good) while also generating revenue for the athletic program (a 
revenue good). 
 58.  WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 11, at 68-70. 
 59.  Id. at 69. 
 60.  For example, many prestigious and highly-selective colleges and universities likely could 
generate substantial revenue by auctioning off to the highest bidders a set number of spots in their 
entering freshmen classes each year.  Of course, doing so undoubtedly would compromise their 
reputations for academic excellence—a mission good they value deeply—so they continue to use 
largely merit-based criteria in making admissions decisions. 
 61.  It is also possible that other paradigms help explain university patent enforcement, in 
addition to or instead of the two-good framework and academic capitalism theory.  I selected these 
two to use as a framework given their plausibility and the significant attention they have garnered in 
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enforcement practices could lead to additional revenues and research 
investments.  Such practices also could alienate other funders and 
undermine public trust in important university research missions.  But so 
could weak enforcement practices.  Thus, gaining insight into how 
university decision-makers interpret and approach this complicated 
activity was the study’s guiding aim. 
C. Participants and Methods 
Drawing on previous research62 and working with a knowledgeable 
gatekeeper, interviewees were drawn from a population consisting of 
high-level TTO personnel at universities identified as having recent 
experience participating as a plaintiff in one or more patent infringement 
lawsuits.  High-level TTO personnel were targeted as study participants 
given that such individuals typically are deeply involved in any 
university decision to bring a patent infringement lawsuit.63  In addition 
to working with faculty inventors to identify and protect patentable 
developments, TTO personnel negotiate deals with businesses willing to 
license and commercialize university-owned patents. When an infringer 
is identified, these professionals liaison with the patent’s faculty 
inventor(s) and industry licensee(s) to help university decision-makers 
understand the risks and benefits of bringing an infringement action. 
The purposeful, non-random sampling technique resulted in 
targeted interviewees at five universities ultimately enrolling in the 
study.  Tape-recorded interviews ranging from forty minutes to over one 
hour were conducted with the participants at AUTM’s 2011 annual 
meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada.64  Operating from a constructivist 
paradigm,65 I took a participatory role in the interviews, exploring with 
participants the nuances of issues by attempting to give voice to a variety 
of plausible arguments, positions, or concerns I believed to be held by 
 
the higher education literature. 
 62.  See generally Rooksby, supra note 21. 
 63.  No doubt others, such as university counsel, are involved in these decisions as well.  
However, I chose to target high-level TTO personnel for participation in the study given their 
deeper level of daily focus on technology transfer operations. 
 64.  Transcripts for the interviews referenced in this article are on file with the author and 
Akron Law Review. 
 65.  Constructivism is a theory of knowledge aimed at building understanding of complex 
phenomena.  Rather than seeking an inflexible, etched-in-stone truth, constructivism treats inquiry 
as a process of constructing a defensible perspective on reality, always subject to further 
development and refinement.  See Egon G. Guba & Yvonna S. Lincoln, Competing Paradigms in 
Qualitative Research, in HANDBOOK OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 105, 110-116 (N. K. Denzin & 
Yvonna S. Lincoln eds., 1994). 
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industry, academic, or policy stakeholders.66  Interview data were 
transcribed and analyzed using an inductive coding process with a view 
toward identifying emerging themes and outlier opinions.67 
All participants were males and held a director-level or equivalent 
senior policymaking position in a TTO at five different public 
universities across the United States at the time of data collection.68  
While study participants certainly do not speak for all universities that 
have litigated patents, their comments do offer meaningful insights into 
an important subset of them. 
In addition to the interviews, relevant data were gleaned from 
observations of a speech by AUTM’s president and attendance at a one-
and-one-half hour session at the meeting entitled “IP Enforcement and 
Infringement Issues for Universities.”69  According to the meeting 
program, the purpose of the session was to “explore the advantages and 
disadvantages of enforcing and litigating patents, including strategies for 
dealing with patent litigation cases.”70  I also spoke informally about the 
research topic with various attendees throughout the annual meeting and 
logged pertinent conversations as field notes.  I used some of the issues 
identified in the aforementioned presentation and conversations as points 
of discussion with the interviewees.71 
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Findings are arrayed thematically in the subparts below, which also 
contain interwoven reactions and commentary concerning how the 
findings expand understanding of the nuances and difficulties presented 
 
 66.  I did, however, follow a general script of questions that helped structure the interviews.  
These questions are included in Appendix A. 
 67.  See JOHN W. CRESWELL, EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: PLANNING, CONDUCTING, AND 
EVALUATING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (3d ed. 2008) for a description of these 
methods and their appropriateness for this type of study. 
 68.  I have withheld participants’ specific job titles, as well as additional details about their 
universities and backgrounds, in the interest of protecting their confidential participation in the 
study. 
 69.   ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM 2011 ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM: 
IMPROVING THE ODDS 32 (2011), available at 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Meeting_Home2&Template=/CM/ContentDispla
y.cfm&ContentID=5392. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Handouts for the session were distributed electronically before the annual meeting began.  
Thus I was able to draw on these materials and other existing literature to formulate interview 
questions.  The specific questions I asked in each interview were similar, although some questions 
changed or developed based on issues or themes that emerged from previously completed 
interviews.  See Appendix A for the general script of questions. 
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by university patent enforcement. 
A. “God Forbid”: Universities Litigate Patents 
Speaking on the last day of the annual meeting, AUTM’s incoming 
president addressed the membership and outlined the organization’s 
purpose and goals.  In describing the role of university technology 
managers, the incoming president stated: 
 
We are licensing and business development professionals. We 
handle technologies from inception through research; we 
handle conflict of interest issues; we close the deals with our 
commercial partners and then (God forbid) we participate in 
litigation on our own or with our licensees to protect our, and 
our inventors’, technology rights.72 
 
Several attendees at the meeting had mentioned to me that AUTM as an 
organization can be less than forthcoming with data or information that 
potentially could be viewed as critical of university involvement in 
technology transfer.73  For example, some point to the fact that, since 
1999, AUTM’s widely cited annual licensing survey has not collected 
information on litigation costs expended by universities, out of apparent 
concern for skewing the data on legal costs.74  Professor Gary Rhoades 
views this exclusion as emblematic of AUTM’s “effort to track mostly 
the credit side of the accounting ledger, monitoring the growth of 
activities and revenues, but not assessing the net gains.”75  For these 
reasons, the incoming president’s forthright placement of university 
patent enforcement as— “God forbid”76 —within the job description of 
TTO personnel struck me as significant.  Do universities now view 
 
 72.  Robin Rasor, 2011-2012 AUTM President, Incoming AUTM President’s Speech at the 
AUTM 2011 Annual Meeting in Las Vegas, NV (Mar. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentID=5537 at 1. 
 73.  Indeed, some attendees seemed to perceive the mere mention of university patent 
enforcement as inherently critical, speculating that few TTO directors, if any at all, would be willing 
to talk with me about it. 
 74.  See Gary Rhoades, Housing the Measurement of University Innovations’ Social Value: 
Organizational Site, Professional Perspective, Institutional Outlook, in 19 ADVANCES IN THE 
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION & ECONOMIC GROWTH 237, 244 (2009) (“[T]he 
AUTM survey provides data on legal fees, but since 1999, these figures have only included the 
costs of patent prosecution, and have not included major litigation fees of universities, or the costs 
of university or externally hired attorneys who deal with technology transfer issues.”). 
 75.  Id. at 244. 
 76.  Rasor, supra note 72. 
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participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as an 
inevitable result of their involvement in patenting and technology 
transfer? 
According to some of the presenters at the annual meeting session 
on “IP Enforcement and Infringement Issues for Universities,” they 
should.77  An attorney in private practice moderated the session, which 
featured three panelists with experience working for or with TTOs in 
matters involving patent infringement litigation.  The moderator opened 
the session by noting that universities increasingly must contemplate 
enforcing their patents through infringement lawsuits.  She listed the 
economic crisis, reduced federal and state funding for higher education, 
drop-offs in donations, and the need to find ways “to increase revenue 
while trying to keep tuition as reasonable as possible for many 
struggling American families” as background factors.  Before 
introducing the panelists, she concluded by saying that “intellectual 
property is a vital asset, and if appropriately utilized, can provide large 
returns.  The most popular ways to capitalize on IP include licensing and 
enforcement.” 
The speaker with the presentation most relevant to my study was a 
partner at a boutique, IP litigation law firm that has significant 
experience representing universities in patent infringement litigation.  
He spoke at length about the common concerns he hears from 
universities that are contemplating enforcing their patents through 
infringement litigation.  His slide presentation and discussion listed 
those concerns as follows: 
 
• Litigation is not part of our mission statement 
• University’s reputation 
• Relationships 
• Prominent alumni 
• Donors 
• Industry partners 
• Cost of litigation 
• Approximately $3 million to $5 million through trial78 
 
Touching on the toothless tiger concern, he noted that “infringers 
 
 77.  Transcript of session on file with the author. 
 78.  Joseph F. DePumpo, Partner, Shore Chan Bragalone DePumpo L.L.P., Speech at the 
AUTM 2011 Annual Meeting in Las Vegas, NV: IP Enforcement and Infringement Issues for 
Universities (Mar. 2, 2011) at 2 (slide presentation available through AUTM and on file with 
author). 
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use all of the above to their advantage,” thinking that universities will 
not actually be bold enough to sue them.79  Others also have detected 
university hesitancy to sue, alleging that “universities are widely 
considered meek when it comes to enforcing their patents.”80  Often this 
perception is correct, the presenter stated, as universities are afraid of 
being labeled “highly litigious,” and some apparently even mistakenly 
fear that assertive patent litigation activity could negatively affect their 
U.S. News and World Report rankings. 
The presenter concluded that universities’ concerns are overstated, 
and that all universities need to consider enforcing their patents.  He 
challenged universities to ask themselves, “Why do we get patents if we 
are not willing to enforce them?”  Noting that enforcement action is a 
“tremendous untapped revenue source,” he suggested that diminishing 
state funding of higher education may turn infringement litigation into 
an attractive gap filler.  The presenter also posited that universities are 
sympathetic litigants, as “no one wants to see universities get taken 
advantage of.”  Assuring the crowd that many top research universities 
“regularly enforce their patents,” he cited recent cases brought by the 
California Institute of Technology, the University of Virginia, the State 
University of New York, and the University of Illinois as examples. 
Despite the activity’s regularity when viewed from a national 
perspective, no participant in my study professed having to consider 
with any predictable frequency whether to pursue an infringer.  One 
participant said such discussions occur “once every two to four years,” 
while the others indicated they are roughly a once-a-year occurrence.  
Simon81 echoed some of the concerns mentioned by the attorney in the 
session on IP enforcement, which he attended.  He said he thought that 
“most universities tend to sort of shy away from litigation.  They’re 
scared of it, because it has this big seven-figure cost associated with it.”  
As participants disclosed, however, some universities have explored 
creative ways to decrease or even eliminate their out-of-pocket legal 
costs in pursuing patent enforcement actions. 
B. “It Just Didn’t Feel Right”: Contingency Fee Litigation and the 
Image of the Troll 
All participants cited the high cost of litigation as an important 
consideration in their decision-making.  Several mentioned pursuing 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Powers, supra note 14. 
 81.  The names of all participants have been changed to protect their confidentiality. 
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litigation on a contingency fee basis with an outside law firm as a 
potential cost-saving measure.  If a law firm takes a case on a pure 
contingency fee basis, the firm receives payment (typically fifteen to 
fifty percent of the amount collected) only if the plaintiff wins a 
monetary judgment or receives money as part of a settlement 
agreement.82  Long associated with personal injury cases, contingency 
fee arrangements increasingly are prevalent in patent infringement 
litigation, particularly in lawsuits brought by “patent trolls.”83  Patent 
trolls often bring infringement actions on a contingency fee basis, as 
doing so does not require payment of any out-of-pocket legal fees.84  
Many hold an unfavorable view of patent trolls—neutrally referred to as 
non-practicing entities (“NPEs”)—because they can delay the fruits of 
innovation from reaching and benefitting the public.85  Some companies 
have argued that universities active in litigating are patent trolls because 
they do not practice their patents, although universities’ substantial 
support of faculty inventors and engagement in other socially beneficial 
activities persuasively undercut this argument.86  The image of the troll 
 
 82.  See HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE 
LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) (reporting contingency fee rates from fifteen to 
fifty percent); see also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 360 (reporting contingency fee rates from 28% to 
40.2%).  Blended arrangements—which combine contingency payments along with fee-for-service 
payments—also exist. 
 83.  See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 343-356.  A patent troll is a pejorative term for an entity 
that does not manufacture, develop, or sell any product covered by the patents it owns, and instead 
sues alleged infringers as its primary method of reaping financial returns on investment.  See 
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The New Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its 
Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297 (2010) for a discussion of patent trolls 
and their function in today’s patent system.  See also Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become 
“Trolls,” WALL ST. J., B1, Jan. 23, 2012 available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203750404577173402442681284.html; Ira Glass 
& Chicago Public Media, When Patents Attack! THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack. 
 84.  See Schwartz, supra note 48. 
 85.  See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012) 
(comprehensively testing the criticisms of and justifications for patent trolls); see also JEFFREY H. 
MATSURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS  (2008) (arguing that patent trolls are as old as the 
patent system itself). 
 86.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (“University patent owners aren’t trolls in my view when they 
contribute previously unknown technology to society, rather than just imposing costs on others by 
obtaining and asserting legal rights over inventions independently developed by others.”); Feldman, 
supra note 20, at 19 (“University behavior . . . tends to be quite different from that of garden-variety 
trolls, and some commentators are uncomfortable grouping the two together.”); Jeremiah S. Helm, 
Comment, Why Pharmaceutical Firms Support Patent Trolls: The Disparate Impact of eBay v. 
MercExchange on Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 331, 335 (2006) (“The 
undeniable fact is that universities are active innovators, while patent trolls, almost by definition, are 
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raises the concern, however, that the manner in which universities 
litigate their patents may impact how others view universities’ 
commercialization activities.87 
Although all participants were familiar with contingency fee 
arrangements, not all indicated they are supportive of them.  Two 
participants spontaneously voiced concern for their institutions being 
viewed as patent trolls without my having used that term earlier in the 
interview.  For example, Simon expressed concern for contingency fee 
arrangements because of the potential that others would see such 
litigation as troll-like.  As he explained: 
It’s an issue for us in the sense that we don’t—these have to be 
genuine cases of true infringement.  We always worry about being a 
troll, and I think that’s a fear that perhaps builds into the way 
universities react, is that they don’t want to be pictured as sort of 
acting like trolls in this environment. 
One participant, Roberto—who indicated that his institution had 
spent over $10 million in legal fees on the last patent infringement 
lawsuit it brought—recommended that institutions newer to technology 
transfer consider contingency fee arrangements if they are looking to 
save costs.  His institution, however, had tried such arrangements before 
and has decided it likely will not pursue them again in the future.  He 
told me why: 
 
Roberto: It was one of those things where if we, given 
what happened . . . I would say, I think, we 
wouldn’t do that again.  We wouldn’t do it 
on a contingency fee. 
 
not. . . . [T]his difference is key.”).  Some universities’ involvement with “mass aggregators,” a new 
species of NPE, may eventually undermine their professed commitment to serving as socially-useful 
bastions of research and innovation.  Perhaps soon to become more disruptive to the patent system 
than patent trolls, mass patent aggregators are entities like Intellectual Ventures that acquire vast 
numbers of patents for purposes of licensing and privateering.  See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 
18, at *36 n. 33 (noting that 5.3% of Intellectual Ventures’ patent portfolio comes from 
universities).  The fifty universities revealed in Ewing and Feldman’s research appear to be 
investors in Intellectual Ventures and/or suppliers of the company’s patents. 
 87.  Cf. Jay P. Kesan, Transferring Innovation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2193 (2009) 
(noting the enduring perception of universities as patent trolls and calling the perception “something 
that universities and their TTOs should take great care to avoid”); Arti K. Rai, The Increasingly 
Proprietary Nature of Publicly Funded Biomedical Research: Benefits and Threats, in BUYING IN 
OR SELLING OUT? THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF THE AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITY 117, 119 
(R. G. Stein ed., 2004) (noting that universities and their licensees have asserted their basic research 
patents “in a manner that hinders rather than facilitates commercial development.”). 
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JR: Why is that?  Just because . . . ? 
Roberto: [The attorneys] we hired were people who 
were very, very good at negotiating 
settlements, but were not in any way, shape, 
or form prepared to go to court . . . . We’re 
not complaining.  They were successful.  It 
just didn’t feel right to the people in the 
office. 
Roger—who previously worked at a large state university’s TTO, 
but recently had accepted a leadership position at a different university’s 
TTO—said he saw contingency fee litigation as “really almost the only 
way to go” for his new institution, given its lack of resources.  He 
recognized that others often view the arrangement dubiously, but he said 
the arrangement’s unfavorable perception would not deter decision-
makers at his institution from pursuing litigation on a contingency fee 
basis if they felt the university had a great case.  Indeed, he noted that 
contingency fee litigation may hold the most appeal for universities that 
are open to pursuing patent infringement litigation but do not have the 
money or internal commitment to pay out-of-pocket for legal fees.88 
Of course, contingency fee arrangements are not without risks or 
consequences, as Roberto recognized by saying suing on contingency 
“just didn’t feel right to the people in the office.”  His comment touches 
on the limitations inherent in the two most common payment models for 
outside counsel: whereas fee-for-service attorneys are financially 
incentivized to over-prepare for trial (thereby costing the university 
more money), lawyers working on contingency may under-prepare for 
trial, in hopes of achieving early payment through settlement.  While 
universities unquestionably save money in the short-term by engaging 
attorneys on a contingency fee basis, in the long-term such arrangements 
may endanger universities’ reputation as well-prepared litigants if the 
case does not settle and instead goes to trial.  For public universities in 
states like Hans’s—where the state attorney general must approve all 
major litigation decisions contemplated by the state’s public 
universities—the reputational risks to the institution may counsel against 
 
 88.  For example, an in-house counsel of a large public university told me at the meeting that 
her university will not pay any amount of money to bring patent infringement actions.  However, 
she said it is not fundamentally opposed to bringing them, and mentioned contingency fee 
arrangements as a viable option.  See also Schwartz, supra note 48, at 376-377 (noting that 
contingency fee representation solves the problem of cash-strapped universities having to pay 
hourly-billing patent litigators). 
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a university’s bringing a case on contingency, despite the potential cost 
savings. 
C. “I Mean Really”: Money Matters 
When asked what factors motivate their institution to bring a patent 
infringement lawsuit, all participants mentioned the hope of receiving 
money through a damages award or out-of-court settlement.  This 
finding would be unremarkable except that nowhere does AUTM, the 
National Academy of Sciences committee, or the authors of the Stanford 
University white paper explicitly mention the pursuit of revenue as a 
reason to pursue patent infringement litigation (although concern for 
“disregard by an infringer of the institution’s legitimate rights”—a 
potential motivation listed in the report issued by the National Academy 
of Sciences committee89—arguably may be viewed as code for revenue 
generation).  But as Roberto told me, “We’re not gonna go and sue 
unless there’s, you know, that we think that there’s money there.”  Hans 
agreed.  “If you feel like there’s a payday, then you should litigate,” he 
said.  Roger expressed this belief even more concisely when I asked him 
why universities sometimes choose to enforce their patents by asserting 
them in infringement actions: “Uhhh, financial return.  I mean really.”  I 
understood his tone either as cheeky—he was saying what people know 
but do not say publicly—or baffled, in that he could not believe I did not 
know the answer to my question.90 
After thinking about it further, Roger also mentioned the 
importance of projecting “the appearance that you’re actually sticking up 
for your IP,” and “being able to go back to the faculty and say, ‘Hey, 
look.  We’re standing behind the IP.’”  But considerations of pleasing 
faculty inventors were secondary for most participants, if mentioned at 
all.  As Roger explained, the institution is always asking, “What do we 
stand to gain from this?  You know, are we going to knock out a 
competitor to our licensee, allowing our licensee to get more market 
share and pay us more royalties?”  Several participants indicated that if 
the potential financial return through participation were not great, their 
institution would be disinclined to pursue the litigation, even if the facts 
 
 89.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 8. 
 90.  Participants’ focus on extracting revenue from patents by litigating them is consistent 
with what some scholars view as the general approach universities take toward technology transfer.  
See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 87, at 2169 (finding that “university technology transfer activities 
continue to be predominantly patent-centric and revenue-driven with a single-minded focus on 
generating licensing income and obtaining reimbursement for legal expenses.”). 
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were otherwise in their favor.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, no one mentioned 
“disregard by an infringer of scientific or professional norms and 
standards” as a motivating factor to sue, as suggested by the National 
Academy of Sciences committee.91  According to the participants, 
pursuing a patent infringement case always involves practical 
considerations of money, often more plainly than ethereal concerns for 
advancing mission. 
As part of the monetary calculation, one participant mentioned that 
the amount of legal fees his university would have to pay to participate 
as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation is more important to 
university decision-making than the amount of money the institution 
stands to gain from bringing such an action.  Sam explained that his 
university is more concerned with stopping “serious infringement, 
serious damage to the university or a business partner” than it is viewing 
litigation as a moneymaking opportunity.  Because of his university’s 
not unusual sensitivity to costs, who pays for the litigation matters, and 
the university attempts to broker cost-sharing arrangements for litigation 
whenever possible (others also mentioned cost sharing with licensees as 
a common approach, and that individual licenses often dictate who will 
pay and how much they will pay).  Sam said it would be hard to imagine 
his university being disinclined to participate as a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement lawsuit if its licensee were willing to bankroll the 
litigation.92  His advice to other institutions that might be considering 
bringing their first enforcement action touched on this concern for costs.  
Participating as a plaintiff in patent infringement litigation is “like 
renovating an old house,” he said.  “Double or triple your budget for 
time and money and effort.” 
D. Exclusive, Non-Exclusive, and Unlicensed Patents 
Participants mentioned that the licensing status of the infringed 
patent—i.e., whether the patent is exclusively licensed, non-exclusively 
licensed, or not currently licensed—impacts how their universities view 
the proposition of bringing infringement litigation.  Some scholars have 
criticized exclusive licenses of university patents as failing to maximize 
 
 91.  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 8. 
 92.  Past analysis of historical licensing data provided to AUTM by its university members 
shows a statistically significant relationship between a university’s expenditure of legal fees and the 
likelihood that a licensee will reimburse the university for its legal fees.  See Kesan, supra note 87, 
at 2169.  However, as mentioned earlier, AUTM’s annual licensing survey specifically excludes 
significant litigation expenses from its definition of legal fees.  See Rhoades, supra note 74 & 
accompanying text. 
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social returns on federal R&D investment.93  Regardless, many 
universities find exclusive licenses attractive because companies are 
willing to pay more for the enhanced market share that necessarily 
accompanies the ability to exclude competitors.94 
Hans identified an additional benefit to universities choosing to 
license their patents exclusively rather than non-exclusively: with 
exclusively licensed patents, the university is likely to bear fewer 
enforcement costs and responsibilities.  He indicated that his university 
avoids non-exclusive deals in part for that reason: 
We’re interested wherever possible in not being the direct litigants, and 
that has shaped our philosophy about how we license.  So we might 
have a choice between doing exclusive licenses or non-exclusive 
licenses.  All things being equal, we’d rather do exclusive licenses 
because when we do a non-exclusive license, we really don’t shed that 
responsibility for protecting IP on behalf of our non-exclusive 
licensees.95 
The suggestion that some institutions may choose to license their patents 
exclusively as opposed to non-exclusively, largely to avoid or diminish 
the burden of enforcement costs and obligations, is startling yet 
previously unexplored by scholars.96  Roberto echoed Hans’s preference 
for exclusive licenses for a related reason.  “If we don’t exclusively 
license [a patent],” he said, “there’s probably not enough money to make 
[bringing litigation] worth it.”  He indicated that his institution had never 
sued over a patent that was licensed non-exclusively. 
I also explored with participants whether their institution ever had 
sued or would consider suing over an unlicensed patent (i.e., a patent for 
which no company has taken a license to practice the technology the 
 
 93.  See, e.g., MOWERY, ET AL., supra note 6, at 191 (criticizing exclusive licenses as being 
oftentimes detrimental to the public good and urging that universities pursue “nonexclusive 
licensing agreements for the fruits of publicly funded research whenever possible”). 
 94.  See, e.g., WEISBROD, ET AL., supra note 11, at 158 (stating that “the greater the monopoly 
power the licensee is granted, the more it would pay for the patent license”). 
 95.  His understanding of patent law on this point is correct.  See Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent 
Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A nonexclusive license confers no constitutional 
standing on the licensee to bring suit or even to join a suit with the patentee because a nonexclusive 
licensee suffers no legal injury from infringement.”). 
 96.  However, ultimately whether a court could compel a university to participate as a 
plaintiff in a given patent infringement lawsuit turns on whether the university owns “all substantial 
rights” to the patent in suit.  See supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text.  For previous 
empirical studies of university licensing, see for example, Kesan, supra note 88; Powers, supra note 
14; Powers & Campbell, supra note 14; Thursby, Jensen, & Thursby, Objectives, Characteristics 
and Outcomes of University Licensing, supra note 14; and Thursby & Thursby, Who Is Selling the 
Ivory Tower?, supra note 14. 
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patent discloses).  Nearly all expressed hesitancy to do this, although one 
took the position that universities should at least be willing to consider 
doing it, even if it means evoking the image of the troll.  Roger said: “I 
understand if you don’t have licensed patents that it may be perceived, 
you know, this trolling issue.  I’m not sure I 100% agree with that.  I 
think you need to enforce patents, period.  Whether or not they’re 
licensed is a factor, but it shouldn’t be a major factor.”  Lawsuits 
brought over an unlicensed patent could mean that the university is 
pursuing what Simon aptly termed an “assertion licensing” strategy—
i.e., initiating infringement litigation as a means by which to license 
patents or, if the case does not settle, obtain rents through a damages 
award.  Suits involving an unlicensed patent also could mean that a 
prospective licensee declined to license the university’s patent, yet went 
ahead and practiced the patented technology anyway, thereby effectively 
inviting the lawsuit.  Whatever a particular university’s reason for 
bringing an infringement action over an unlicensed patent, such cases 
are not hypothetical: indeed, nine American universities filed ten 
different cases over unlicensed patents in the two-year period from 2009 
through 2010.97 
In the prevailing complex patent ecosystem, rife with secondary 
markets for patents,98 examining the nature of a university’s licensee 
may in fact be more telling than inquiring whether there is a licensee for 
any given university patent that is litigated.  As several industry vendors 
mentioned to me at the AUTM meeting, litigation management 
companies have developed a business model aimed at assisting 
universities wary of asserting their unlicensed patents.99  In such 
arrangements, a litigation management company creates a special NPE 
for the purpose of receiving an exclusive license from the university to 
an unlicensed patent.  The arrangement is not structured in the typical 
way, where the licensee intends to produce (or is already producing) a 
product covered by the patent, and in turn generates royalties for the 
university from sales of the product.  Instead, the NPE exists solely for 
the purpose of acquiring all substantial rights to the university’s 
 
 97.  Rooksby, supra note 21, at 662.  Relatedly, thirty-four percent of all patent infringement 
lawsuits brought by universities from 1973 through 2010 did not include a licensee co-plaintiff 
(although not all of these cases necessarily involved unlicensed patents).  See Rooksby, supra note 
33. 
 98.  See generally Chien, supra note 83 (describing the secondary market for patents); Ewing 
& Feldman, supra note 18 (same). 
 99.  An example of such a company is General Patent Corporation, which specializes in 
enforcing university patents.  See GENERAL PATENT CORP. (2011), 
http://university.generalpatent.com/.  Poltorak, supra note 9, is the company’s CEO. 
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unlicensed patent and asserting an infringement action based on it.  This 
arrangement effectively transfers university ownership of the patent in 
exchange for a contractual right to a portion of any proceeds generated 
by the NPE in the litigation.100 
One attribute of this type of arrangement is that it removes the need 
for universities to participate as named plaintiffs in the ensuing 
infringement actions.  Another is that it typically requires no out-of-
pocket costs from universities, as the entire enforcement activity is 
structured on a contingency fee basis.101  Should any money be returned, 
the university receives a portion of it.102 
        Several participants confirmed the general contours of this type of 
arrangement, although all said their universities never had engaged in it.  
Sam surmised that it is probably more popular with small universities 
lacking the financial or political capital to litigate a patent that they have 
not been able to license. 
E. Tigers Take Bribes? Infringer Identity and Retribution 
Participants cited a prospective defendant’s identity as relevant to 
their universities’ decisions concerning patent enforcement.  A 
frequently mentioned example was concern for the research conducted 
by faculty unrelated to the invention and commercialization of the 
infringed patent.  Hans, for example, professed being sensitive to the 
concern that a potential defendant that also sponsors faculty research 
might withdraw its funding if the university sues the company.  He 
defended this sensitivity by saying that “just because you have patent 
rights doesn’t mean you have to litigate against someone who’s 
 
 100.  The Bayh-Dole Act places limitations on the assignment of university-owned patents.  
Under 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(A), universities may not assign patents developed with federal funds 
without the approval of the federal agency that provided those funds, unless the “assignment is 
made to an organization which has as one of its primary functions the management of inventions.”  
While the exception likely was drafted with assignments to established, university-affiliated 
research foundations in mind (like, e.g., WARF), the wording of it arguably does not preclude 
application to NPEs created for the express purpose of managing inventions through asserting 
infringement litigation. 
 101.  One vendor told me that litigation management companies commonly seek outside 
investors to help fund incidental costs related to this type of enforcement activity.  These investors 
then share in any returns generated by the activity. 
 102.  It bears noting that the Stanford white paper—which AUTM and the National Academy 
of Sciences committee endorsed—urges universities to be mindful of arrangements such as these, 
stating that universities “would better serve the public interest . . . by requiring their licensees to 
operate under a business model that encourages commercialization and does not rely primarily on 
threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue.”  See Leland Stanford Univ., supra note 39, at 
8. 
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infringing,” although he recognized that “you’re opening the door for 
others to infringe” by allowing this concern to dissuade one’s institution 
from litigating. 
Roberto also identified infringer retribution as a potentially 
deterring factor, although his institution has established financial 
resources intended to neutralize its impact: 
A couple of times when we have filed suit, of course, then the 
company we sue pulls money from our [faculty] investigators.  And we 
have made it a policy when that happens, we go and make them 
whole . . . .  So I think with our latest litigation, there are at least four, 
maybe six, professors that we had to make whole. 
No other participant indicated that his institution has a policy of 
“making whole” faculty who lose sponsored research funding because of 
their university’s decision to sue for infringement the company that 
funds the research.  Sam and Roger agreed, though, that the infringer’s 
identity can be a deterring factor.  “No one would admit that proudly or 
in a steadfast, outward manner,” Sam said, “but that has been part of the 
discussion I have encountered from time to time.” 
Simon was the lone participant who bristled at the notion of taking 
a defendant’s identity into consideration in deciding whether to sue, 
mostly because of the signal he believes it could send to other potential 
licensees.  As he described: 
I get concerned when I hear implications that people say, well, we’ve 
got this major research partner and donor, and why would we sue 
them?  Especially when they’re infringing rights we granted to another 
partner, especially a small partner.  The first day a university says, 
“I’m sorry, I don’t wanna sue and support you, small business, because 
your big-business competitor is gonna take away all my research 
dollars,” that’s a huge nail in the coffin of university technology 
licensing, because why would a venture capital company say, “I’m 
gonna put my money into this small company.  I know we’re probably 
likely to have to sue, because we’re trying to make a constructive 
change, but there’s this big industry out there, and they can give ten 
million dollars to the university.  Not a problem.”  So they give you ten 
million dollars to make the litigation go away. . . . That toothless tiger 
is worse when it’s not just a toothless tiger, it’s willing to take a bit of 
a bribe—an inducement not to participate. 
Simon expressed further concern that faculty inventors (who, as 
mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act and institutional IP policies, receive a 
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percentage of royalties the university derives from any patents that list 
them as inventors)103 could sue the university for failing to support their 
rights if the university elected not to pursue an infringer. 
The participants’ recognition that patent enforcement may bring 
financial ramifications for the activities of university faculty distant from 
the issues of the litigation speaks to the complexities of varying and 
sometimes conflicting university missions.  Universities facing threats or 
perceived threats that faculty will lose research funding if a patent 
infringement lawsuit is brought against an influential company no doubt 
confront a difficult decision: pursue an infringer to please a licensee 
and/or to receive financial rewards, or yield to a threat that could affect 
unrelated faculty research funding.  Is the former foolish?  Is the latter a 
bribe (as Simon suggested)?  Universities in this dilemma appear to face 
a Morton’s-fork choice involving complicated allegiances to money and 
mission. 
F. When Mission Means Money, Tigers Bare Teeth 
All of the participants grappled in some way with harmonizing the 
revenue-generating potential of patent infringement litigation with the 
socially beneficial aims of the university.  Commercialization and 
mission were the leading buzzwords in this process of explanation.  
Several noted that their universities had made technology 
commercialization a goal of their institution’s research mission, and 
therefore felt that litigation over the commercialization of technology 
was implicitly condoned.  Although participants recognized that some 
view patent infringement litigation as an inappropriate activity for 
universities to engage in as plaintiffs, none shared this belief.  Most, in 
fact, described patent infringement litigation as consistent with their 
institution’s research mission, suggesting that they had heeded the 
pronouncement from the authors of the Stanford University white paper, 
that litigation should be initiated only if there is a “mission-oriented 
rationale for doing so.”104  Hans’s description—in response to a question 




 103.  See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2012) (requiring “the contractor to share royalties with the 
inventor”); see also Margaret T. Stopp & G. Harry Stopp, Jr., The Enforcement of University Patent 
Policies: A Legal Perspective, 24 SRA J. OF RES. ADMIN. 5 (1992). 
 104.  Leland Stanford Univ., supra note 39, at 6. 
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Hans: Do you mean, would we be concerned 
about suing someone, because people could 
say, universities shouldn’t sue? 
JR: Right, that’s what I’m getting at. 
Hans: No, no, we’re okay.  You know, we just 
gotta write the correct press releases.  You 
know, ‘cause it allows people to understand 
that we’re doing this because it’s what the 
patent system is supposed to allow us to do.  
It’s important to our mission.  We just have 
to tie it back to our mission.  So, yeah, I’m 
not concerned about that. 
JR: So suing could be OK if you do it consistent 
with the research mission? 
Hans: Oh, it’s absolutely consistent.  I mean, [our 
university] has as part of its mission, 
commercializing technology.  It’s in the 
mission statement.  It’s unusual.  Educating, 
writing, doing service, you know, teaching, 
graduating students; and commercializing 
technology.  It’s one of the things we do. 
When commercialization is the goal, participants indicated that 
bringing patent infringement litigation must be an available option, even 
if the activity rankles some faculty members or offends others’ notion of 
what a public university ought to be doing with its resources.  Although 
Hans understands why some faculty may object to the activity, 
ultimately he is not influenced by their concerns: 
I can easily understand why my colleagues would be nervous about 
suing.  It’s something that really puts it out there in people’s faces that 
we’re doing commercialization. . . . The faculty—there are concerns 
that commercialization is wrong.  They came to the university to get 
away from those kinds of considerations.  So . . . there’s a little bit of a 
cultural clash, which we resolve by commercializing technology in a 
way that serves the mission of the university and doesn’t pull off in a 
different direction. 
        . . . . 
That’s just how we have to do it.  You know, the founding fathers put 
patent protection and copyrights in Article 1, Section 8, of the 
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Constitution.  They thought having patent rights was a good idea. . . . 
We’re supposed to make the world a better place.  And if we have to 
use commercialization—which is a perfectly legitimate set of 
practices—to achieve our mission, we should. 
Hans’s references to the Constitution and making the world a better 
place illustrate what I saw as a common attempt among participants to 
find a respected hook on which to hang the hat of university patent 
enforcement, which otherwise often gets lumped as one of several 
uncelebrated “practices” within the vague meaning of the word 
commercialization.  Simon also situated the activity within a higher 
calling, citing President Barack Obama’s focus on university innovation 
as effectively requiring universities to consider patent infringement 
litigation.  “At some point,” he said, “if you believe in [the White 
House’s innovation agenda], you’ve gotta be willing to fully support all 
elements of IP protection, which includes litigation.  And if you wanna 
talk the talk, you better walk the walk.” 
Simon’s comment about “walking the walk” implicitly references 
the economic realities of patenting.  Patents are blunt instruments that 
have been likened to toll booths.105  “The threat of damages and, 
typically, injunctive relief, is a proverbial club useful in securing license 
fees and other payments from actual and potential infringers.”106  Failure 
to enforce a patent could mean the loss of the premium conferred to a 
university from seeking and obtaining the patent, as “the efficacy of a 
patent depends on its owners’ ability to police their property.”107  Simply 
put, a company that infringes a university’s patent may perceive little 
incentive to stop infringing unless sued. 
Participants very much appreciate the foregoing constraints.  
“That’s why you file patents, is to support them and enforce them,” 
Roger said.  “You know, big places, when you file a patent, there’s 
gonna be infringement.  It’s just the nature of the beast, and there’s real 
advantages to stepping up to the plate and enforcing it,” he said.  Sam 
agreed, stating that “the reason to get patents in the first place is to 
control their use in the market.”  Simon acknowledged these realities in 
 
 105.  See Walter W. Powell, Jason Owen-Smith & Jeannette A. Colyvas, Innovation and 
Emulation: Lessons from American Universities in Selling Private Rights to Public Knowledge, 45 
MINERVA 121, 123 (2007) (stating “patents represent a toll booth”); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS 
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 51 (2004) (calling 
patents “blunt instruments”). 
 106.  Sichelman & Graham, supra note 53, at 118-119. 
 107.  Owen-Smith, supra note 7, at 94. 
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the frankest of terms: 
A patent without enforcement is a piece of paper with Dave Kappos’s 
signature on it.  That’s all it is, you know.  It’s a very expensive piece 
of paper.  I can get Dave Kappos’s signature for a lot less than 
$30,000. . . .  If you’re not willing to enforce it, that’s all you’ve got.108 
Although participants understand the economic realities of patents, 
and in fact view their institutions’ participation as plaintiffs in patent 
infringement litigation as essentially an inevitable consequence of 
engaging in technology transfer, several acknowledged that their 
university’s leadership is not always receptive to pursuing infringement 
litigation.  On the one hand, university administrators prefer (and some 
may even expect) their TTOs to generate revenue; on the other hand, 
those same administrators not always are comfortable admitting to 
various constituencies that revenue generation or commercial goals drive 
or should drive most aspects of their TTO’s mission.  However, all 
participants stated that when fostering commercialization is part of a 
university’s stated or implied mission (as increasingly is the case),109 
initiating patent infringement litigation occasionally can further that 
mission, and is not by definition inconsistent with it.  Participants may 
have to remind administrators that they did not create the patent system 
or the commercialization framework contemplated by the Bayh-Dole 
Act; however, they are constrained to operate within that system and 
framework, which means using patents to exploit the limited monopoly 
they confer on their holders, be it through licensing or litigation.110  As 
Simon described: 
 
 108.  At the time of data collection, David Kappos was the Director of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, the governmental entity that awards patents.  Depending on various factors, 
obtaining a patent can cost anywhere from $10,000 to $45,000 or more in legal fees, and thus 
Simon’s reference to $30,000. 
 109.  See, e.g., Michael M. Crow, Beyond the “New Normal” in American Higher Education: 
Toward Perpetual Innovation, in SMART LEADERSHIP FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN DIFFICULT TIMES 
50-69, 58 (David W. Breneman & Paul J. Yakoboski eds., 2011) (calling commercialization “the 
most obvious avenue to move academic research at the ‘edge of newness’ from the laboratory to the 
marketplace.”). 
 110.  Should a university elect to retain title to an invention discovered in the course of 
research funded in part with federal money, the university must diligently seek to patent the 
invention, unless the agency funding agreement provides otherwise.  See SEAN O’CONNOR, 
GREGORY D. GRAFF, & DAVID E. WINICKOFF, LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 29 (Nat’l Research Council: The Nat’l Acad. 2010), 
available at 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/xpedio/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_058897.pdf.  
Sponsored research agreements typically place universities under the same obligation. 
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If our mission is to get technology out there to benefit the public, one 
way we do that is we engage the patent system to protect it so that 
others will invest money.  Because of that, we have the ability to 
exclude competitors for a limited time.  You’ve got to buy into the 
notion that the way you get that monopoly is by enforcing those 
patents.  If you don’t understand that, you’ve missed the principle of 
this element of our mission. 
That’s just the rules of the game.  “You like that royalty income.  We 
don’t talk about the money.  It’s not about the money.  But trust me, 
you’d like me to bring several million dollars a year more into the 
university.”  You’ve got to understand it comes with that price.  If 
you’re not willing to play that game, then that money isn’t coming, and 
you won’t be able to serve that part of the mission effectively.  At 
some point, it’s part of it, in my mind. 
While the complex union between mission and money goes 
undeclared at many universities engaged in patenting and technology 
transfer, comments from participants in this study unveil what some 
within higher education may view as an uncomfortable truth: when 
revenue generation is a university research mission, patent infringement 
litigation is an activity that can further that mission.  Indeed, it may even 
reveal it. 
G. Summary 
The study described in this article was driven by an interest in 
building understanding of university patent enforcement from the 
perspective of key decision-makers at universities recently involved as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement lawsuits.  Points of inquiry included 
probing participants for the main factors or constraints their universities 
consider in determining whether to enforce their patents through 
infringement litigation, as well as gaining insight into institutional 
balancing of revenue generation and allegiance to university research 
mission through the pursuit of patent infringement litigation. 
Findings suggest that some universities view participation as 
plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation as condoned or even mandated 
by their research and commercialization missions, despite what some 
critics view as the activity’s incompatibility with the notion of a 
university’s public-serving mission.  On a practical level, revenue 
generation is often a principal motivator for universities that choose to 
enforce their patents through infringement litigation, even though 
industry literature only indirectly references litigation’s revenue-
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generating potential.  In this regard, when it comes to enforcing patents, 
universities’ research goals and revenue-generating goals seem deeply if 
not inextricably intertwined. 
The high cost of legal fees, as well as concern for being viewed as 
overly litigious (troll-like), may provide disincentives for some 
universities contemplating pursuit of patent infringers.  While 
contingency fee arrangements with outside law firms can help 
universities counter the high cost of enforcing their patents in court, 
reputational risks related to these arrangements may deter their use.  
Additionally, the identity of would-be defendants may cause some 
institutions to abandon pursuit of their infringement claims out of 
concern for retribution to the university, particularly with respect to 
sponsored research funding. 
The nature of the infringed patent (i.e., whether it is exclusively 
licensed, non-exclusively licensed, or unlicensed) can impact decision-
making as well.  Concern for the responsibility and costs of litigating 
non-exclusively licensed patents may lead some institutions to favor an 
exclusive licensing strategy for their patents, on the belief that doing so 
will save them money and may even spare their involvement as a 
plaintiff in any infringement action.  Although many universities may be 
hesitant to litigate unlicensed patents, shrewd companies have devised a 
way for them to turn unlicensed patents into putatively licensed ones, 
thereby contravening the Bayh-Dole Act’s purposes and masking the 
character of what some may view as speculative enforcement activity. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Several participants noted that universities as a group tend to avoid 
discussion of patent infringement litigation as an aspect of technology 
transfer.  As Simon described it, “It’s one of those things we don’t like 
to talk about.  We like to talk about patents and licensing.  But we don’t 
like to talk a lot about [litigation].”  Examining university patent 
enforcement may be uncomfortable for some universities and 
policymakers, but overlooking the phenomenon only undermines 
comprehension of the net effects of university involvement in 
technology transfer. 
While quantitative data are growing, the study described here is the 
first dedicated qualitative attempt to build understanding of the nuanced 
factors that impact university decisions concerning patent enforcement.  
Its findings should encourage decision-makers at universities heavily 
engaged in patenting and technology transfer (as well as those just 
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beginning to build capacity in these areas) to critically examine 
institutional goals and dispositions to use patent infringement litigation 
to protect and enhance university research missions in the public 
interest.  In short, universities must confront a difficult but inescapable 
question: When it comes to enforcing our patents, will our university be 
a tiger with teeth? 
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Tell me about your current position and the work that you do. 
 
When I say “university initiation of patent infringement litigation,” 
what does that mean to you? 
 
In what capacities within your institution have you been involved 
with that activity in the past? 
 
I’m interested in getting your thoughts on the activity in general.  
What factors do you believe motivate universities in general to litigate 
patents? 
 
Are those the same factors that typically motivate your institution to 
litigate patents? 
 
How important would you say is the question of who pays legal 
fees to your institution’s decision to litigate patents? 
 
How important would you say are the opinions of groups like 
students, faculty, inventors, licensees, and the general public concerning 
planned patent infringement litigation to your institution’s decision to 
initiate such litigation? 
 
How important is the potential for revenue generation to your 
university in deciding whether to sue for patent infringement? 
 
How big would the potential return to your institution from 
participating in an infringement suit as a plaintiff have to be in order to 
make the suit “worth it,” in your opinion? 
 
Do you believe that initiating infringement litigation is an 
inevitable activity for institutions that have a significant number of 
licensed patents?  Would you put your institution in that category? 
 
Do you see the activity as central to, or in furtherance of, your 
institution’s research mission? 
 
Do you know if your institution budgets for bringing patent 
infringement suits?  If so, could you tell me how your institution plans 
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or prepares for the activity? 
 
What is the primary factor that would likely deter your institution 
from bringing a patent infringement lawsuit, assuming you were 
confident that a company were infringing?  Or do you always bring 
lawsuits if you think you’ve located an infringer? 
 
What’s the highest level of individual within your institution that 
would have to sign off on a decision to bring a patent infringement suit 
(e.g., VP for Research, President, full governing board vote, vote of 
chair only, etc.)? 
 
What role, if any, does any separately incorporated research entity 
controlled by your institution play in any decision to bring a patent 
infringement action?  Does that entity ever participate as a plaintiff in 
combination with, or instead of, your institution in such suits? 
 
Are there any pieces of advice or words of caution that you might 
give to other institutions that may be contemplating bringing a patent 
infringement action? 
 
How frequently is this activity discussed within your institution or 
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